Greenland and Europe’s Strategic Power
Imperial Ambitions, European Autonomy, and the Crisis of Security
by Walter Baier, President of the European Left
Donald Trump’s intention to incorporate Greenland into the United States is not merely an expression of imperial hubris. It is also driven by economic and geopolitical calculation: access to raw materials, control of northern sea routes, and the militarisation of the island.
Greenland, however, is not for sale. Its inhabitants have made that unmistakably clear. The Party of the European Left condemns this latest outrage by the Trump administration and supports the Greenlanders’ right to self-determination and decolonisation, as well as the defence of their sensitive ecosystem—which is vital for the global climate—against exploitation and militarisation.
Since taking office on 1 January 2025, Donald Trump has ordered no fewer than seven military attacks on seven countries, including a villainous act in Venezuela. Europe’s leaders have either stood by passively or made themselves complicit in the genocide in Gaza, even though it is clear that these attacks are aimed at dismantling any multilateral order, to be replaced by the unrestricted global dominance of the United States.
At the NATO summit in June, they swallowed the 5-per-cent spending target imposed by Trump. In July, Ursula von der Leyen signed an agreement with Trump, ironically titled the Agreement on Reciprocal, Fair, and Balanced Trade—despite the fact that it provides for a unilateral waiver of EU tariffs on American imports. Under the present circumstances, it is logical for the European Parliament to block this agreement.
Trump’s grab for Greenland marks the end of any illusion that Europe’s security can rest on NATO and US nuclear weapons. His bromance with Putin, and the fact that he has chosen northern Europe as the stage for his confrontation with the EU, expose how wrong Finland and Sweden were to abandon decades of proven neutrality and non-alignment in order to join NATO.
European Autonomy
If not now, when would be the moment for Europeans—NATO members and neutral states alike—to demand the withdrawal of US nuclear weapons and the closure of American military bases?
For Ursula von der Leyen, ‘European autonomy’ has become a slogan to justify rearmament and the militarisation of the EU. Yet genuine European autonomy is far more demanding. It requires, among other things, ending the dependence on US liquefied natural gas created by the war in Ukraine, and dismantling the monopolistic dominance of US corporations in the digital sector and in financial services. An independent European industrial and technology policy, however, cannot be realised within the straitjacket of neoliberal austerity. Here too, the obstacle to autonomy is one of Europe’s own making.
The premise underlying EU and NATO arms policy is fundamentally flawed. If the European NATO members already spend many times more on armaments than the Russian Federation, bogged down in an illegal war, then the source of insecurity cannot lie in a lack of military hardware. Security does, of course, have a military dimension, but it is first and foremost a political objective, to which the military must be subordinate.
It should be clear that a secure and autonomous Europe can only be achieved in conditions of peace—peace strengthened by agreements on the non-use of force in relations between states, by confidence-building measures, and by steps towards disarmament. That this is not a utopia was demonstrated by the signing of the Helsinki Final Act. To build on it would be a logical conclusion Europe should draw from Trump’s policies.
The most important step on this path is to end the war in Ukraine. Europe’s leaders are setting a grotesque example of colonial servility by leaving Donald Trump the role of mediator in a conflict that is existential for Europe. Brazil, India, China—even the US—talk with Putin; only EU leaders refuse to do so. If they were capable of anything, they would now launch a European dialogue with both the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships and play an independent role as mediators.
Nor is this the only context in which they reveal their inability to pursue a coherent policy. Instead of seeking allies in the looming trade dispute with the United States, the European Commission decides—at the very moment China and Canada announce a strategic partnership—to exclude Chinese providers from the European telecommunications and infrastructure market, thereby embarking on a trade war of its own.
True, in his Cold War against the EU, Trump can rely on his ideological allies in the radical right, who are part of governing coalitions in a third of EU member states. Yet if it so desired, the EU leadership would still find ample options for action and resistance. Instead, it chooses to appease him and collaborate with the radical right.
But Europe would not be powerless, provided there were the will to act and the corresponding balance of power within its institutions.